

"TO CARE FOR HIM WHO HAS BORNE THE BATTLE, AND FOR HIS WIDOW AND ORPHANS."

ESTABLISHED 1877.—NEW SERIES.

WASHINGTON, D. C., THURSDAY, JUNE 5, 1884.

VOL. III—NO. 43.—WHOLE NO. 147.

GENL. O. O. HOWARD'S

Personal Reminiscences of the War of the Rebellion.

CHANCELLORSVILLE.

Jackson's Flank Movement and Attack on the 11th Corps.

A STUBBORN STAND.

Confederate Accounts of the Assault—Howard's Action.

By Major-General O. O. Howard, U. S. A. (Copyrighted—All Rights Reserved.)

XXVIII.

In order to give as intelligent an account as possible of the battle of Saturday, May 2, 1863, let us first examine the reports of two or three Confederate officers who were near the Furnace, two miles and more in front of my left flank, in the afternoon. Lieutenant-Colonel N. J. George, commanding the 1st Tennessee (Confederate), gives a brief story of what was done there upon the enemy's side. His column (General Jackson's) had nearly passed. Jackson had ordered out skirmishers and supports—the 23d Georgia formed part—to watch that point of turning till the trains got by. All this had been done. Colonel George says: "While on this circuitous movement we had passed an iron foundry (the Furnace), and had gotten about three miles from it, when General Archer (a Confederate brigade commander) was informed that the train in our rear was attacked by the enemy at the foundry, upon which he took the responsibility of moving his own and General Thomas' brigade back to resist the attack. On getting near the foundry we found that the enemy had been repulsed by a regiment of Georgians, assisted, perhaps, by four companies from the 7th and 14th Tennessee." Finding nothing left to be done, these brigades had turned about and marched on. But in Archer's report we find that it was Lieutenant-Colonel J. T. Brown, with his artillery, aided by some infantry, who "repulsed" our troops at the Furnace.

According to these stories it would seem as if a single battery of Confederate artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, a Georgia regiment (probably the 23d Georgia is intended) and fragments of other regiments (7th and 14th Tennessee) did all the mischief to us that was done that day by Jackson's Confederate troops while on their circuitous march; and this was at or near the Furnace. In other words, from our point of view, the whole movement and flank attack made by Sicks' entire command, aided by Pleasanton's cavalry and by Slocum's support on his left, with at least a division, and by Barlow's fine brigade during the afternoon of Saturday, was met and thoroughly resisted by the little handful of men that I have named.

A MISTAKE.


But, by looking a little further, we find that this is a mistake. It was the Confederate force to be left behind, and almost none of Jackson's moving column, which met our advance about 9 o'clock in the morning. Anderson (the Confederate division commander) shows how it was arranged. He first fired Posey's brigade from the front line, holding it well in the rear. When Jackson began his march, Anderson watched us closely. "At midday the enemy [Sicks' corps, Birney's division] appeared in some force at the Furnace. Posey's brigade was sent to dislodge him, and was soon engaged in a warm skirmish with him. This combat became so lively and Posey was so hard pressed that he called for help. Then Anderson took Wright's brigade from the line, somewhere in front of Chancellorsville, and sent it promptly to the support of Posey. Further, it appears that part of Major Hardaway's artillery was added to that of Lieutenant-Colonel Brown. Both of these large brigades of Posey and Wright, then, were with artillery, deployed as long as possible; fought, by increasing their skirmishers, till night; intruded as soon as they could. Anderson concludes: "Posey's brigade gallantly maintained its position against great odds, and checked the further advance of the enemy."

I have been thus particular, in order to make it very clear that General Hooker's attack upon Stonewall Jackson's flank at the Furnace was not really made. It was General Lee himself who, during Jackson's wonderful march, took care, with Anderson and McLaws and part of his artillery, of our whole line, except the 11th corps, minus Barlow's brigade. Hooker's movement, gallantly maintained away from my flank all immediate support to be expected from Barlow, Birney, Berry, Whipple, Geary and Williams; and, further, these divisions were looking, moving, and fighting in an opposite direction. They were engaged, not as General Hooker supposed, telegraphed and said, with Lee in full retreat, but with Lee himself, after Jackson's departure, controlling in that wilderness-front the smaller wing of his army. Lee took great risks, as he did at Guinea Mills before Richmond, where 25,000 men only, under Magruder, held in check the whole of McClellan's army except Porter's corps, while he (Lee) with the remainder crossed the river and defeated Porter and all the supports that McClellan wanted to send him. The difference here was that Lee took the place which near Richmond he had assigned to Magruder; and he sent Jackson, who could somehow make a fiercer and more persistent attack than the general-in-chief, leaving to himself a most hazardous and difficult operation.

From the CONFEDERATE STANDPOINT.

As all general things are made a little clearer to the mind when they appear in the concrete, we will follow up a brigade in Jackson's moving column and see what it saw and did. Let us try Dole's brigade of D. H. Hill's division. E. E. Dole was for the time in command of the division. Brigadier-General George Dole commanded that Saturday (May 2) four Georgia regiments. It was not far from the Furnace, about half a mile to the east, on a "dirt road," whence he started early in the morning. His troops moved in column to the Furnace and fired off to the left toward Spotsylvania, thence

kept on toward and beyond our right till about 3 o'clock, when they reached what Dole calls the "Germania" road. Before this, at the plank road, as the brigades crossed, our cavalry had been skirmishing with that of the enemy. Jackson ordered a temporary halt; but, concluding to go still farther, the Confederate brigade crossed the plank road and kept on under cover of the thick woods to "the old turnpike." This and the "Germania" road must be the same. The lines of battle were there formed about 4 o'clock p. m., thus:



THE CONFEDERATE ATTACK.

These two divisions were formed in two lines about a hundred yards apart; front line, by brigade, Iverson, Rodes, Dole, Colquitt; second line, Rammer behind Colquitt, and Trimble's division on the same alignment. Should these brigades preserve the order of arrangement which I have indicated, the greater part of Iverson's brigade would be beyond our General Devens' waiting line of battle, beyond his right battery, and beyond Von Gilsa's line, the supporting brigade. Still, with ten minutes' notice, Devens was prepared to have extended his line with ten or fifteen minutes' hard fighting, like that of Frank Blair's command, the 22d of July, '64, at Atlanta, the day McPherson fell, where Hood attempted precisely what Jackson did here—that is, to turn our flank. Hood's Confederates enveloped the flank; Blair's men repelled them in front, and then turned and repelled others by jumping over their breastworks and firing towards the flank and rear till help came.

We shall see how it was here with Devens and Von Gilsa. Dole says: "At 5 p. m. the order was given to advance against the enemy." If his time was right, it must have taken an hour to work forward "through the very thick woods." He first encountered our skirmishers, who were so obstinate that it required a main line to drive them back; then his men were "subjected to a very heavy musket fire, with grape, canister and shell." Immediately his line was ordered to assault our barricades and intrenchments, drive our defenders off and seize our long line reaching beyond our left, across the road far enough to reach our left, and charged with the others straight forward. Notice how he describes this: "After a resistance [by Devens' men] of about ten minutes, we drove him from his positions on the left and carried his battery of two guns, caissons and horses." Our Von Gilsa's brigade supported these two guns, so that most probably Dole's left regiment broke through the interval between Von Gilsa and the remainder of his division, while Rodes' own brigade faced Von Gilsa, and certainly the greater part of Iverson's long line reached beyond his position. So Von Gilsa's brigade and troops to his left, looking from our side, were driven from their intrenchments and rolled along down Devens' line, creating a panic in nearly all of his front.

THE SECOND STAND.

But now there was another line to be encountered; for Dole goes on to state: "The command moved forward on the double-quick to assault the enemy, who had taken up a strong position on the crest of a hill in the open field." This was the first resistance made by Devens' reserve regiments and parts of Carl Schurz's division on the hill east of Hawkins' house. Our men were driven again. Dole observes next: "He [that is, some of our troops] made a stubborn resistance from behind a walling-fence on a hill covered thickly with pine." Against this force Dole brought his whole brigade, succeeded in driving it in and capturing a rifle-gun, and then pursued rapidly for some "300 yards over an open field." During this move the Confederates "met a very severe fire from musketry and a battery of four guns on the crest of a hill that commanded the field below. His [our] infantry was in large force and well protected by rifle-pits and intrenchments." I may say to say that this intrenchment line was where I made my headquarters during the action. We had filled these intrenchments, which had been prepared for Barlow's brigade, with fragments of regiments and such individual men as, having been separated from their regiments, volunteered to stay and help. Steinwehr, who was always at hand, brought me some one or two regiments. At first the reserve artillery at that point fired rapidly and did well. Confederate Dole says it took his people about twenty minutes to take this place. It was at last taken, because the instant that the fire became severe our men there, who had no commander at hand, closed in to retire, and the last command (for there were more than one) was left without a support. Dole's words for this point are: "The enemy fell in utter confusion, leaving his battery of four pieces, his wounded and many prisoners." The truth is that some of the batteries were withdrawn in good order. Dilger's, for example, kept up its fire as it retired along the Chancellorsville road.

By thus carefully following the doings of one Confederate brigade the others are not left out; for their history is similar. Some of them—all in rear—closed all intervals, so that the two original Confederate lines became one, and all moved on in a mass together, yelling and firing and double-quickening to their hearts' content.

HOWARD'S PERSONAL MOVEMENTS.

Possibly it will do no harm for me to run over this entire action, which lasted somewhat over an hour, from my own points of observation. I was at Dowdall's Tavern when I heard the first attack on our skirmishers in the dense woods. I sent a staff officer (Colonel Amusement) at once to see that all was right in the direction of the fire. I soon mounted my black horse and rode toward Devens' headquarters; I had proceeded some 300 or 350 yards when I heard a terrific firing on our right, and looking, saw Von Gilsa's men running from their position. They and the battery there rushed toward me. I immediately made an effort to change the front of part of Devens' and all of Schurz's division. The rush of the enemy made this next to impossible. To render matters worse for me personally, my horse got crazy, like some of the panic-stricken men, plunged and reared and left me on the ground. Of course, I was soon mounted, but this hindered and delayed personal work. I went at once to Steinwehr's position, and, as I have

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SAVING THE NATION.

The Story of the War Retold for Our Boys and Girls.

WESTERN OPERATIONS.

Bragg's Plans for Invading the Border States.

THE MORGAN RAID.

General Kirby Smith Menaces the Safety of Cincinnati.

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XXVII.

To the Boys and Girls of the United States:

We have followed the Army of the Potomac during the summer of 1862, and now turn west to see what the armies in that section of the country have been doing.

The battle of Pittsburg Landing was fought in April. In June the Confederate army under Beauregard retreated to Tupelo, in Mississippi, where Beauregard was succeeded by General Bragg. On the Union side, General Halleck, who had commanded all the Union armies west of the Alleghenians, was called to Washington and made General-in-Chief. He made the mistake of dividing the army which had fought the battle of Pittsburg Landing and scattering it in detachments all the way from Memphis to Chattanooga. The army under General Grant, which had fought during the first day at Pittsburg Landing, held the country between Memphis and the little town of Iuka, twenty-five miles east of Corinth on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. The army under General Buell was farther east. Opening your map you will see Huntsville, in Alabama, a very pretty place, north of the Tennessee, where Buell's right wing was stationed. It is only 100 miles from Iuka. Going east from Huntsville in a straight line sixty miles we come to the little hamlet of Jasper, north of Chattanooga, where we find the left wing of his army. Some of the divisions are at Decatur. Buell is obliged to receive his supplies either from Memphis or Nashville, where there are depots filled with food, beef and pork.

The army is not so large as it was in June, for the time of the soldiers who enlisted for a year has expired. They have gone home, and their places have not been filled by new recruits.

BRAGG'S PLANS.

General Bragg planned a movement of the Confederate army from Tupelo to Chattanooga. The troops went on board the cars south to Mobile, then north the entire length of Alabama to Chattanooga. The wagons moved across the country. By this movement, as you will see by a glance at the map, he was in a position to strike General Buell's left flank.

His ranks, which had been thinned by the battle of Pittsburg Landing, were once more filled up—not by volunteers, but by men who had been forced into the army under the conscription act passed by the Confederate Congress.

The people of the South seceded from the Union in defense of State rights, but they were beginning to see that State rights were a sham; that the government set up by the Confederate Congress was a despotism. If a conscript resisted, he was seized by force. If a conscript deserted himself, he was hunted down by soldiers.

General Lee was moving north in Virginia, and General Bragg resolved to march north and invade Kentucky, which would compel General Buell to fall back to the Ohio River. At the same time General Kirby Smith was to march from East Tennessee due north into Eastern Kentucky, to Lexington, Frankfort, and on towards Cincinnati.

SUCH A MOVEMENT IT WAS THOUGHT WOULD TRANSFER THE THEATRE OF WAR TO THE BANKS OF THE OHIO.

It was believed that there were thousands of young men in Kentucky who would join the Confederate army. Bragg hoped to capture Louisville and invade Ohio. Kentucky was rich in horses. The harvest had been gathered; he could live upon the country. He would create terror in the Western States just as General Lee was creating consternation at Washington by his invasion of Maryland.

CONFEDERATE MOVEMENTS.

The Confederate cavalry was far superior to the Union cavalry. At the beginning of the war the Union Government did not encourage the formation of regiments of cavalry, because the outfit was so costly. On the other hand, the Confederates saw that cavalry, by making rapid movements, could be used with great effect.

At Murfreesboro' was a brigade of Union troops—the 3d Minnesota (Colonel Lester) and 9th Michigan (Colonel Duffield), with four pieces of artillery and a company of cavalry. General Crittenden commanded the post. The officers disagreed; there was little discipline, and things generally were at loose ends. The officers forgot that "eternal vigilance is the price of liberty." General Forrest, commanding a brigade of Confederate cavalry, saw his opportunity. From spies he knew how things were—the 3d Minnesota regiment was encamped east of the town and six companies of the 9th Michigan west of it. They were really three miles apart. One company of the 9th was quartered in the court-house.

It is not known how the negroes around Murfreesboro' discovered what Forrest intended to do, but it is certain that a negro came into town and said: "Massa Forrest is coming with a big army, sure."

FORREST'S ATTACK.

Daylight is streaming up the east July 19, when the Union pickets south of Murfreesboro' hear a clatter of hoofs upon the turnpike and discover a long line of cavalry coming like the wind. The pickets fire their guns. The guards in town hear the clatter of the 2,000 horses and give the alarm. The soldiers in the court-house bar the doors. With a whoop and yell the Georgians and Texans galloped through the streets, capturing the Union guards and taking possession of the town. Two of the Confederate regiments dashed upon

the camp of the 9th Michigan, but the regiment rallied and drove the rebels. Colonel Duffield was wounded, but his soldiers fought bravely. Forrest attacked the 3d Minnesota, but Colonel Lester formed his troops and opened fire. Forrest dashed round to Lester's rear and attacked the camp, but was again driven. He went back to the 9th Michigan, dismounted two of his regiments, sent the 2d Georgia to get in rear of the Union troops, then hosted a white flag, and sent a message to Duffield, demanding his surrender, and Duffield complied with this demand. Having captured them, he turned about and made the same demand upon Lester, who was too weak to resist. So 1,700 men, four cannon, 600 mules and horses, and a million dollars worth of supplies were lost. Forrest carried away what he could and burned the rest.

General Nelson, commanding the nearest troops, started to capture Forrest, but as he had no cavalry Forrest trotted away eastward to McMinnville, then rode north fifty miles to Lebanon, then dashed west nearly to Nashville, captured 150 guards along the railroad, burned four bridges, and rode back to McMinnville.

MORGAN'S MOVEMENT.

John H. Morgan, who was born at Lexington, Ky., and who had served in the Mexican war, was bold and brave. He had joined the Confederates and raised a regiment of young men, who were ready for any adventure. They were mostly Kentuckians, acquainted with the country. General Bragg sent him to destroy the railroad between Louisville and Nashville over which General Buell received his supplies. He started from Knoxville, in East Tennessee, July 4, with 1,000 men, mounted on good horses. He crossed the Cumberland Mountains northwest, reached Tompkinsville, in Kentucky,—150 miles from Knoxville,—and captured four companies of Union cavalry. Not stopping, he pushed on to Glasgow, forty miles north of Tompkinsville, and captured some supplies. He issued a proclamation calling upon all true Kentuckians to join him. A few wild and restless fellows enlisted. His horses were tired and he rested one day, and then rode north to the railroad near Mammoth Cave and destroyed a bridge across Barren River.

THE TELEGRAPH OPERATOR.

General Morgan had a very skillful telegraph operator,—George Ellsworth,—who had an instrument in his pocket, which he quickly attached to the wires. On July 10, Morgan and Ellsworth, with a body-guard of fifteen men, reached the Louisville and Nashville road. Ellsworth climbed the telegraph pole, took down the wire and put on his instrument. Pretty soon he read a message from General Brown, who was in Louisville, to General Brown at Bowling Green. It was raining, but all through the evening Ellsworth read off the messages to Morgan, learning all the news of the day, besides a great deal about military officers. Morgan found out that Stanley Matthews was provost-marshal of Nashville, and so sent a dispatch to Henry Dent, who was provost-marshal at Louisville. Thus he read: "General Forrest attacked Murfreesboro', routing our forces and is now moving on Nashville. Morgan is reported to be between Scottsville and Gallatin, and will act in concert with Forrest."

On the 12th Morgan reached Lebanon, and Ellsworth took possession of the telegraph office at 3:30 o'clock in the morning. He waited till 7:30, when the instrument began to click. He found that the operator, whoever he was, was calling B, which he discovered from the book was the Lebanon office, and was signing himself Z. Ellsworth answered the call. Then came the questions and answers: "What news? Any skirmishing after your last message?" "No; we drove what little cavalry there was away."

"Has the train arrived yet?" "No; about how many troops will there be?" "Five hundred."

Ellsworth did not know what office he was talking with, but determined to find out, and sent this message: "A gentleman has bet the cigars that you cannot spell the name of your station correctly."

"L-e-b-a-n-o-n J-a-n-e-t-t-o-n."

How did he think it would spell it?" "He gives it up. He thought you would put in two b's in Lebanon."

"Not so! He's a green one."

"Yes; that's so. What time did the train with soldiers pass?" "At 8:30 last night."

"Very singular where the train is."

"Yes; let me know when it arrives."

But the train did not arrive. A few minutes, and Ellsworth heard from an operator that it had gone back to Lebanon Junction, and that the soldiers on the train had been taken with some of Morgan's cavalry. General Morgan went to Midway, where Ellsworth accompanied him. For several days he used the wires, sending a great many dispatches and intercepting all the Union dispatches. The Union officers in Louisville, Nashville and everywhere else were greatly mystified over the dispatches and orders which they received. Morgan upset all their plans.

From Somerset, on July 22, Morgan sent this dispatch to General Boyle, the Union commander at Louisville—his old friend: "Good morning, Jerry. This telegraph is a great institution. You don't destroy it, as I keep me too well posted. My friend Ellsworth has all your dispatches since the 10th of July on file. Do you wish copies?" He sent this to Hon. George Dunlap, another old friend: "Just completed my tour through Kentucky. Captured sixteen cities; destroyed millions of dollars worth of United States property; paroled 1,500 Federal prisoners. Passed through your country, but regret not seeing you."

Morgan went north to Cynthiana, only fifty miles from Cincinnati, but finding Union troops were closing around him he retreated to Tennessee.

KIRBY SMITH'S MOVEMENT.

A month passes. Bragg is getting ready to move, and so is Kirby Smith, who is at Knoxville, and who is to invade Eastern Kentucky. He sends Colonel Scott with 900 cavalry and several pieces of artillery in advance, who passes through Monticello and crosses the old battle-ground at Mill Springs. On the 29th General Smith approaches Richmond, only thirty miles west of it. The troops numbered nearly 7,000, but they were new recruits. There was a skirmish and battle, with bad management on the part of Mansson. His army was thrown into confusion. He

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THE SHILOH CAMPAIGN.

Failure of the Third Division to Reach the Field.

ON THE MARCH.

The Roar of Battle Quickens the Steps of the Men.

ON THE WRONG ROAD.

A Countermarch of the Column Exhausts the Afternoon.

XIII.

The division of General Lew Wallace, consisting of three brigades, under command of Colonels Morgan L. Smith, John M. Thayer and Charles M. Whittlesley, with a battalion of cavalry and two batteries of artillery, was stationed on the road leading from Crump's Landing to Purdy, six miles from the battlefield, and, although within hearing of the artillery, took no part in the battle.

That the brave and efficient commander of the 2d division, whose energy and presence of mind had saved the Union army from defeat and rout at Donelson, willfully disobeyed an order delivered to him at 11:30 in the forenoon to march at once to the field of battle, is unworthy of belief. That he lost his way, as has also been affirmed, in the boys of Snake Creek, is equally incredible. Yet the fact remains that at the hour of its greatest need the Army of the Tennessee, fighting from dawn until darkness fell upon the field, was deprived of the services of 5,000 men.

POSITION OF WALLACE'S DIVISION.

General Wallace's division occupied three camps: Smith's brigade was encamped near Crump's Landing, Whittlesley's at Adamsville, five miles out the Purdy road, and Thayer's at a point called Stony Lonesome, midway between the last two brigades first mentioned.

Between the first and second camps the Hamburg and Savannah roads crossed the Purdy and Crump's Landing roads and following the bend in the river led past W. H. L. Wallace's camp near Pittsburg Landing. This was called the River road. Another road from Adamsville to Hamburg, crossing Snake Creek in rear of Sherman's right brigade, two miles above the bridge, on the River road, from Stony Lonesome two roads led, the one into the upper and the other into the lower road. These roads, it will be observed, formed a Z with the feet extending towards the battlefield. The road from Crump's Landing to the upper Hamburg road had been selected by Wallace as that over which he would march in case he was ordered—or compelled by an attack from overwhelming numbers—to join the main army near Shiloh Church. If led directly to the right of General Sherman's line, and had by order of General Wallace been ordered, to admit the rapid movement of artillery. General Wallace's account of his march is as follows: "Hearing heavy and continuous cannonading in the direction of Pittsburg Landing early Sunday morning, I inferred a general battle, and in anticipation of an order from General Grant to join him at that place, had the equipment of the several brigades loaded in wagons for instant removal to my first camp at the river."

THE MARCH AND COUNTERMARCH.

The 1st and 3d brigades were also ordered to concentrate at the camp of the 2d, from which proceeded the nearest and most practicable road to the scene of battle. At 11:30 o'clock the anticipated order arrived, directing me to come up and take position on the right of the army and form my line of battle at a right angle with the river. As it also directed me to leave a force to prevent surprise at Crump's Landing, the 56th Ohio and 88th Ohio regiments were detached for that purpose, with one gun from Lieutenant Thayer's battery. Selecting a road that led directly to the right of the line as they were established around Pittsburg Landing on Sunday morning, my column started immediately, the distance being about six miles. The cannonading, distinctly audible, quickened the steps of the men. Snake Creek, difficult of passage at all times, on account of its steep banks and swampy bottoms, ran between me and the point of junction. A short way from it Captain Rowley, from General Grant, and attached to his staff, overtook me. From him I learned that our lines had been beaten back; that the right, to which I was proceeding, was then fighting close to the river, and that the road pursued would take me in the enemy's rear, where, in the unfortunate condition of the battle, my command was in danger of being entirely cut off. It seemed, on re-consideration, most prudent to carry the column across to what is called the "River road," which, following the windings of the Tennessee bottoms, crossed Snake Creek by a good bridge close to Pittsburg Landing. This movement occasioned a counter-march, which delayed my junction with the main army until a little after night-fall. The information brought me by Captain Rowley was confirmed by Colonel McPherson and Captain Rawlins, also of the general's staff, who came up while I was crossing to the River road. About 1 o'clock at night my brigades and batteries were disposed, forming the extreme right, and ready for battle."

THE MYSTERIOUS ORDER.

The written order brought by Captain Baxter was lost. Colonel Rawlins, who dictated it to Captain Baxter on board the steamer Tigress, on which boat the latter proceeded to Crump's Landing, stated, a year later, his recollection of the wording of the order. He says: "In obedience to your command I proceeded to the river, and found Captain Baxter at the landing near where the Tigress lay, and communicated to him your orders, who, fearing lest he might make some mistake in the delivery of the orders, requested me to give him a written memorandum of them, and I went on board the steamer Tigress, where a pen and ink could be procured, and at my dictation he wrote substantially as follows: 'Major-General Wallace: You will move forward your division from Crump's Landing, leaving a sufficient force to protect the public property at that place, to Pittsburg Landing, on the road nearest to, and parallel with, the river, and form in line at right angles with the river, immediately in

rear of the camp of Major-General C. F. Smith's division on our right, and there await further orders.'

General George F. McGinnis, at that time commanding the 11th Indiana infantry, Wallace's original regiment, stated, in a speech delivered at Tipton, Indiana, in 1883, that "the order itself was written in pencil on a scrap of dirty paper, which had the mark of a boot-heel upon it, which was explained by Captain Baxter, saying that Grant's order to him was verbally given on the field, and the fear he might make some mistake in delivering it, he had picked up the scrap and written it down while fresh in his memory. On being asked by Wallace, 'How goes the battle?' he answered, 'We are driving them.'

A MANIFEST DISCREPANCY.

"There is some dispute as to the wording of the order. Wallace says the substance of it was: 'Leave sufficient troops to guard the public property at Crump's Landing, and move with the rest of your division to Pittsburg Landing and form line of battle by column of regiments by right angle with the river.' Major James R. Ross, of Wallace's staff, read the order, and says that he remembers that the order directed Wallace 'to move forward and join General Sherman's right on the Purdy road, form your line of battle at right angles with the river, and then act as circumstances dictate.' That, in my opinion, was the proper order at the time, under the existing positions occupied by the two armies."

There is a manifest discrepancy in the statements of General McGinnis and Rawlins, not only in the wording of the order, but in the circumstances under which it was written. Everything depends upon the wording of the order, and as the order is lost, the subject will probably remain open for discussion until the crack of doom. As the route taken by General Wallace would in any event have brought him into the action nearer the front than that claimed by Rawlins to have been indicated in Grant's order, General Wallace is to be credited with a desire to get into the fight, even if he misunderstood the route by which his division was to be brought upon the field.

It would seem, however, that a portion of the cavalry attached to Wallace's division could have been moved advantageously in scouting upon both roads, and thus saved the column of infantry a wearisome march of fifteen miles, and the commander much unneeded abuse.

NOTES FROM SHILOH.

E. T. Lee, 41st Illinois of Illinois, Ill., is justly proud of the regiment with which he served.

Having read with great interest the "Shiloh Campaign," as published in THE TRIBUNE, I wish to add my testimony to the correctness of this most interesting and truthful narrative. It is now that we are getting the correct history of the war, written by those who took part in that memorable struggle. The books and histories, written by newspaper correspondents, and by men who never were on a battlefield or smelled powder, could not be correct. Now that the boys in blue who did the work are reporting their transactions, we will have it correct in every particular. I belonged to company I, 41st Illinois veteran volunteers, 1st brigade, under General S. A. Hurlbut, and our division was the first to land on the river road leading to the landing. Our regiment—the 41st Illinois—was the first to land from the steamer Alex. Scott (afterward the ram Queen of the West). We landed our guns on the boat and deployed as skirmishers up the hill and through the woods, finding no enemy as yet. At that time, now, to the surprise at Shiloh, I am of the opinion that many were surprised. Even the commanding officers of the 41st, did not fully understand the situation; for, had they known we were to be assailed by so large an army, they would have been better prepared. Shiloh was the "crucial battle" of the Western army, the same as Bull Run was to the Eastern army. The lesson was a dear one, but it taught our generals to be prepared in all their future movements. The day was won on the field at Shiloh, and passed out the Corinth road, where the 41st Illinois lay waiting for the attack, not later than 9 a. m. This was the last line of defense formed in support of the army. The 41st Illinois, however, did not fully understand the situation; for, had they known we were to be assailed by so large an army, they would have been better prepared. Shiloh was the "crucial battle" of the Western army, the same as Bull Run was to the Eastern army. The lesson was a dear one, but it taught our generals to be prepared in all their future movements. The day was won on the field at Shiloh, and passed out the Corinth road, where the 41st Illinois lay waiting for the attack, not later than 9 a. m. This was the last line of defense formed in support of the army. The 41st Illinois, however, did not fully understand the situation; for, had they known we were to be assailed by so large an army, they would have been better prepared. Shiloh was the "crucial battle" of the Western army, the same as Bull Run was to the Eastern army. The lesson was a dear one, but it taught our generals to be prepared in all their future movements. The day was won on the field at Shiloh, and passed out the Corinth road, where the 41st Illinois lay waiting for the attack, not later than 9 a. m. This was the last line of defense formed